Comments

HOSPITAL AND BLOOD BANK LIABILITY TO
PATIENTS WHO CONTRACT AIDS THROUGH

BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS

As AIDS contagion spreads at epidemic proportions, and fear of
the fatal disease runs rampant, it is noteworthy to recognize the
legal impacts of the disease, especially as they affect the health

care profession. Hospitals and blood banks face potentially unlimited liability if found legally responsible for transmitting AIDS

through blood transfusions. A question remains as to what liabil-

ity standardmay provide or prevent recovery. This Comment balances the interests in providing recovery to AIDS victims against
the interests in promoting availablepublic health care and medical advancement.
INTRODUCTION

Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) has become the
nation's primary health concern" since the first cases were reported
1. The United States Department of Health and Human Services has designated
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as the nation's primary health concern.
Review of the Public Health Service's Response to AIDS (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-TM-H-24, Feb. 1985), at 6 [hereinafter
cited as Review]. The House of Representatives has recognized that AIDS is reaching
epidemic proportions and that funding for prevention, treatment, and education is necessary to curtail the public health crisis. 130 CONG. REc. H10517-20 (daily ed. Oct. 1,
1984) (statements of Reps. Waxman and Weiss). In response to the emergency, Congress enacted Senate Bill S.2301, entitled "Preventive Health Amendments of 1984,"
Pub. L. 98-555, 98 Stat. 2854, on October 30, 1984, specifically authorizing the Director
of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to make grants for education, diagnosis, prevention, and control of AIDS. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247c(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). Furthermore, in 1985 the CDC announced the availability of funding for AIDS testing, 50
Fed. Reg. 9909 (1985), as well as for studies of transmission through pregnancy, 50 Fed.
Reg. 16556 (1985), and through blood transfusions. 50 Fed. Reg. 30295 (1985). Most
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in 1981.2 More than 24,000 AIDS cases have been reported to the
Centers for Disease Control, and more than 13,000 AIDS-related
deaths have occurred.3 The epidemic continues as researchers struggle to develop an effective cure.4
Until recently AIDS victims typically belonged to four risk group
categories. 5 A new group of AIDS victims, however, has
recently, the CDC has announced funds for the fiscal year 1986 for AIDS prevention,
health education, and risk reduction on both the state and community levels. 51 Fed.
Reg. 3427 (1986).
On a more local front, in states in which AIDS is most prominent, legislation has been
enacted establishing advisory committees and programs to combat the contagion, as well
as establishing funding for AIDS education, victim support programs, and telephone hotlines. E.g., CAL, HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 195 (West Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
26:5C-1 to -4 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2775 (McKinney 1985).
The AIDS epidemic not only poses a serious health concern, but also carries with it
several legal implications. Within the past three years, AIDS litigation has increased
concerning issues of constitutional rights for AIDS victims, discrimination against children with AIDS and the rights of those children to attend school, as well as tort litigation for transfusion-associated AIDS. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Cooperman, 209 N.J.
Super. 174, 507 A.2d 253 (1986)(classroom attendance for AIDS-diagnosed children);
District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d
325 (1986) (constitutional question of equal protection regarding exclusion of AIDSinfected children from school attendance as violation of Rehabilitation Act which does
not allow discrimination against the handicapped); South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (discovery of names of blood donors
in tort litigation); M., ex rel. S. v. R., 127 Misc. 2d 931, 487 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1985)
(blood test to determine paternity did not pose threat of AIDS); LaRocca v. Dalsheim,
120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1983) (treatment of prisoners with AIDS in correctional facility).
2. CDC Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 34
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 245, 248 (1985) [hereinafter cited as CDC
Update 1985]. The first symptoms, however, appeared as early as 1978. Squires, The
Impact of AIDS on Blood Donations, 46 N.C. MED. J. 353 (1985).
3. These figures are based upon statistics available through September 1, 1986.
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Weekly Surveillance Report-United
States AIDS Program, Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control (Sept.
I, 1986) (provisional data available from the Department of Health & Human Services,
Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia) [hereinafter cited
as AIDS Weekly Surveillance Report]. It is difficult to estimate the actual number of
people who have contracted AIDS, for a long latency period is associated with the disease. The onset of AIDS after contracting the virus takes an average of 27.5 months,
with a general range from 15 months to 57 months. Fischinger, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome: The Causative Agent and the Evolving Perspective, 9 CURRENT
PROBLEMS IN CANCER 4, 19 (1985). It has been suggested, however, that the incubation
period can be as low as six months. Perspectiveson the Future of AIDS, 23 J. AM. MED.
A. 247 (1985); see also Weiss, Hollander & Stobo, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Epidemiology, Virology, and Immunology, 36 ANNALS REVISED MED. 545, 549
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Weiss].
4. See, e.g., 51 Fed. Reg. 3427 (1986); Frazer & Donald, First International
Conference on the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 142 MED. J. AUSTL. 31, 34
(1985). The cause of AIDS was announced in April 1984 to be the Human T-cell
lymphotropic virus type III (HTLV-III). See Squires, supra note 2. More recently, however, researchers indicate that other viruses also may be implicated in the AIDS contagion. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
5. The original four risk groups are homosexual males (71%), intraveneous drug
users (17%), Haitian immigrants (5%), and hemophiliacs (1%). CDC Update: Acquired
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emerged-those who have contracted the disease through transfu-

sions of blood and blood products. 6 Blood banks, hospitals, and blood
product manufacturers are the target against whom AIDS victims
may seek recovery, based upon various theories of liability for manufacturing, marketing, or supplying AIDS-infected blood and blood
products.

This Comment explores the possible theories of recovery available
to blood transfusion recipients who contract AIDS. The Comment

examines the medical and statistical data regarding AIDS and how
these data may affect recovery and concludes that negligence pro-

vides the only viable means of recovery for transfusion-associated
AIDS. Nonetheless, significant barriers remain which may preclude
any hospital or blood bank liability.
AIDS AND BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS

Researchers initially found AIDS indigenous to members of four
risk

groups:

homosexual

males,

intraveneous

drug

users,

hemophiliacs, and Haitian immigrants.7 Since intraveneous drug
users were a frequent group susceptible to the disease, researchers

suspected that AIDS might be passed through blood.8 This hypothesis was bolstered by the fact that hemophiliacs were a minor yet still

prevalent risk group.9 After months of research, the medical commuImmunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) -

United States, 32

MORBIDITY & MORTALITY

REP. 688, 689 (1984); see also Curran, Lawrence, Jaffe, Kaplan, Zyla,
Chamberland, Weinstein, Lui, Schonenberger, Spira, Alexander, Swinger, Ammann,
Solomon, Auerbach, Mildvan, Stoneburner, Jason, Haverkos & Evatt, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Associated with Transfusions, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED.
69, 70 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Curran].
6. Blood products include platelets, whole blood, fresh frozen plasma, and
packed cells in varying amounts. Most patients in need of transfusions require on the
average three units of blood products. See Goldsmith, Reactions and Counter-Reactions
to Transfusion-Associated AIDS, 251 J. AM. MED. A. 177 (1984).
7. See, e.g., Fischinger, supra note 3, at 5.
8. Sandier & Katz, Impact of AIDS on Blood Services in the United States, 46
VOX SANGUINIS 1 (1984).
9. Hemophiliacs comprise approximately one percent of AIDS victims. AIDS
Weekly Surveillance Report, supra note 3; CDC Update 1985, supra note 2, at 246. It is
estimated that one in every thousand hemophiliacs will contract the disease. This is the
highest risk of any of the four risk groups. Fischinger, supra note 3, at 18. Hemophiliacs
are a high risk group because of their constant need for blood and coagulation factors
during bleeding episodes. Furthermore, the clotting factors used for treatment of hemophilia can come from 2000 to 25,000 donors, increasing the risk that the coagulation
factor is infected with the AIDS virus. Hilgartner & Aledort, AIDS in Hemophilia, 437
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sc. 466 (1984); see also Derrick, AIDS and the Use of Blood
Components and Derivatives: The CanadianPerspective, 131 CAN. MED. A.J. 20 (1984).
Upon discovery of the potential effect of AIDS upon coagulation factor, hemophiliacs
WEEKLY

nity officially recognized that AIDS could be transferred by infected
blood. 10
Reports within the past five years indicate that, in addition to

hemophiliacs, a small percentage' 1 of AIDS victims had received
blood transfusions.12 These AIDS victims comprise a fifth risk
group. 13 Though small compared to the other risk groups,"4 the incidence of transfusion-associated AIDS has grown steadily since
1981.15 In light of the estimated three million blood transfusions
given each year, the number of blood transfusion recipients who will
develop AIDS remains small.1 6 Nonetheless, the potential for liability is substantial because most patients who contract the virus and
develop AIDS 17 subsequently die from the disease.' 8

have been advised to change from Factor VIII to cryprecipate, which the medical community believes is less susceptible to the AIDS virus. AIDS and the Treatment of Hemophilia, 84 MICH. MED. 62 (1985); see also Evatt, Ramsey, Lawrence, Zyla & Curran,
The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in Patients with Hemophilia, 100 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 499 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Evatt].
10. See, e.g., Curran, supra note 5; AIDS Transmission Via Transfusion Therapy, 8368 THE LANCET 102 (Jan. 14, 1984); Evatt, supra note 9.
I1. Recent reports indicate that between one and three percent of AIDS victims
have blood transfusion-associated AIDS. CDC Update 1985, supra note 2; AIDS Weekly
Surveillance Report, supra note 3.
12. Feorino, Jaffe, Palmer, Peterman, Francis, Kalyanaraman, Weinstein,
Stoneburner, Alexander, Raevsky, Getchell, Warfield, Haverkos, Kilbourne, Nicholson
& Curran, Transfusion Associated Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 312 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1293 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Feorino].
13. This group consists of people who have had blood tranfusions and have denied
being either members of the various risk groups or sexual partners of AIDS victims. See
Infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
14. Over 20,000 cases have been reported of homosexual males and intraveneous
drug users who have contracted AIDS compared with less than 500 transfusion-associated AIDS cases which have been reported. AIDS Weekly Surveillance Report, supra
note 3.
15. Before January 14, 1984, 34 (1.1%) transfusion-associated AIDS cases were
reported. From January 14, 1984 to January 13, 1985, 56 (1.2%) transfusion-associated
AIDS cases were reported. From January 14, 1985 to January 13, 1986, 171 (2.0%)
transfusion-associated AIDS cases were reported. CDC Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 17,
20 (1986) [hereinafter cited as CDC Update 1986]. From January 1, 1986 to September
1, 1986, 177 (2.0%) transfusion-associated AIDS cases were reported in adults and adolescents. AIDS Weekly Surveillance Report, supra note 3.
16. See Derrick, supra note 9.
17. Some people may contract the virus but never develop the disease. Safe Blood
for Transfusion, 25 THE MED. LETTER 93 (1983). Studies indicate that the HTLV-III/
LAV virus is "associated with an asymptomatic carrier state, a mildly symptomatic state
with transient immunologic abnormalities . -. , and other malignant conditions" besides
acquired immunodeficiency. Perspectives on the Future of AIDS, 253 J. AM. MED. A.
247 (1985); see also Feorino, supra note 12. For a discussion of a system of classifying
infected persons with the retrovirus of AIDS according to its various manifestations, see
CDC Classification System for Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus Infections, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 334
(1986).
18. As of April 1985, 4942 people had died from AIDS (49% of adults and 69%
of children who had contracted the disease). CDC Update 1985, supra note 2. Nonethe-
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In June 198419 researchers discovered that a retrovirus, 20 human

T-cell lymphotropic virus type III/lymphadenopathy-associated virus
(HTLV-III/LAV),2 1 was the probable cause of AIDS. 22 In 19853

testing procedures 24 were initiated to screen blood products and potential blood donors for antibodies of the HTLV-III/LAV virus.2 1
less, 75% of the AIDS patients diagnosed before January 1983 have died. Id. More recent reports indicate that as of January 13, 1986, 8361 people have died from AIDS
(51% of adults and 59% of children who have contracted the disease), and that 71% of
the patients diagnosed before July 1984 have died. CDC Update 1986, supra note 15.
It should be noted that AIDS victims do not die from the virus itself. The virus attacks
the immune system by depleting the body's T-4 helper cell lymphocytes. Weiss, supra
note 3, at 553-55. Consequently, the AIDS patient is susceptible to opportunistic infections to which the immune system, through the T-4 helper cells, cannot respond effectively. Id. The most common of the opportunistic infections is pneumocystis cariniipneumonia. Fischinger, supra note 3, at 9.
Curiously, victims of blood transfusion-associated AIDS most commonly develop these
opportunistic infections, while a significant portion of the homosexuals who contract
AIDS develop Kaposi's sarcoma, see Weiss, supra note 3, at 549; Fischinger, supra note
3, at 11, identified by multiple tumor-like lesions on the skin. Giraldo, Beth &
Buonaguro, Kaposi's Sarcoma: A Natural Model of Interrelationshipsbetween Viruses,
Immunologic Responses, Genetics, and Oncogenesis, 32 ANTIBIOT. CHEMOTHER. 1
(1984). It has been suggested that several factors contribute to homosexuals contracting
Kaposi's sarcoma, particularly an enormous increase in sexual promiscuity with a variety
of partners. This increase in sexual activity fosters the spread of a wide variety of infections and ultimately leads to the development of Kaposi's sarcoma. Id. at 5-6; Fischinger,
supra note 3, at 13; see also Weiss, supra note 3, at 546. Nonetheless, AIDS victims
subsequently die from these infections. The mean age of most victims of transfusionassociated AIDS is 54, see Weiss, supra note 3, at 549, and most contract the disease
during the course of surgery. See, e.g., Curran, supra note 5, at 74. Men and women are
represented equally; whites, however, more commonly are the victims of blood transfusion injuries. Fischinger, supra note 3, at 19.
19. Fischinger, supra note 3.
20. Perspectives on the Future of AIDS, 253 J. AM. MED. A. 247 (1985).
21. Human T-Cell Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated
Virus (HTLV-III/LAV) otherwise may be known as AIDS-associated retrovirus (ARV).
Feorino, supra note 12. Nonetheless, some researchers feel that HTLV-III, LAV, and
ARV all are closely related but not identical. See Fischinger, supra note 3, at 5; Weiss,
supra note 3, at 551.
22. Blood Transfusion, Hemophilia, and AIDS, 8417 THE LANCET 1433 (Dec.
22/29, 1984).
23. On March 2, 1985, the test for HTLV-III/LAV antibodies in blood was licensed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 50 Fed. Reg. 9909 (1985).
24. The test is an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) which has
proved to be 98.6% specific and 97.3% sensitive for antibodies to HTLV-III/LAV, but
does not ensure against "false positive" results. Weiss, Goedert, Sarngadharan, Bodner,
The AIDS Seroepidemiology Collaborative Working Group, Gallo & Blattner, Screening
Test for HTLV-III (AIDS Agent) Antibodies, 253 J. AM. MED. A. 221, 223-24 (1985).
25. Id. at 223. In most blood banks, the ELISA test should have become fully
operational before May 1985. Squires, supra note 2, at 354. Besides blood donation centers, alternate test sites have been established at which an individual at high risk of
contracting AIDS may determine his antibody status. The primary goal of such alternate
centers is protecting the nation's blood supply, that is, limiting the possibility of false-

The availability of the blood screening test-ELISA-should reduce

significantly
the number of future transfusion-associated AIDS
26
cases.
THEORIES OF RECOVERY

A victim of transfusion-associated AIDS may pursue recovery

under several legal theories. A strict liability action may lie against
a blood product manufacturer, a hospital, or a blood bank, for placing defective blood onto the market. An AIDS victim also may claim
a breach of implied warranty in a case in which defective blood is
supplied. Finally, an action in negligence may be brought for inadequate blood testing or donor screening.
Each theory has been asserted in lawsuits by blood transfusion recipients who have contracted serum hepatitis, 27 though products lia-

negative donations. See Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type IJI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus Antibody Testing at Alternate Sites, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 284 (1986).

26. Squires, supra note 2, at 354.
27. The following cases have been brought upon a strict liability theory:
Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 522 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying Tennessee law);
Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Servs., 506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Louisiana law);
Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977);
McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 444 (1976); Cramer v. Queen of Angels Hosp., 62 Cal. App. 3d 812, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 339 (1976); Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal.
Rptr, 132 (1973); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo.
1983); St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 188 Colo. 353, 534 P.2d 781 (1975); Fisher v.
Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979); Rostocki v. Southwest
Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973); McAllister v. American Nat'l Red
Cross, 240 Ga. 246, 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977); Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp.,
47 III. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970) (superseded by statute); Glass v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp., 32 I11.App. 3d 237, 336 N.E.2d 495 (1975); McMichael v. American Red
Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975); De Battista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co.,
403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981), on remand, 410 So. 2d 279 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied,
Faciane v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 459 U.S. 836 (1983), and writ denied, 427 So.
2d 1208 (La. 1983) (superseded by statute); Faucheaux v. Alton Ochsner Medical
Found. Hosp. & Clinic, 468 So. 2d 720 (La. Ct. App.), rev'd, 470 So. 2d 878 (La.), writ
denied on reconsideration,474 So. 2d 944 (La. 1985); Martin v. Southern Baptist Hosp.,
Inc., 352 So. 2d 351 (La. Ct. App. 1977), writ denied, 354 So. 2d 210 (La. 1978);
Juneau v. Interstate Blook Bank, Inc., 333 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 337
So. 2d 220 (La. 1976); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975);
Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 111,
529 P.2d 1232 (1974); Morse v. Riverside Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 422, 339 N.E.2d 846
(1974); Garvey v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 756, 697 P.2d 248 (1985).
The following cases have been brought upon an implied warranty theory:
Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 552 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying Tennessee law);
Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Servs., 506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Louisiana law);
McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 339 (1976); St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 188 Colo. 353, 534 P.2d 781 (1975);
Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979); Lewis v. Associated Medical Insts., Inc., 345 So. 2d 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d
676 (Fla. 1977); Williamson v. Memorial Hosp., 307 So. 2d 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Benitez, 257 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); White v.
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bility and implied warranty actions often have proved unsuccessful.
Significant similarities exist between AIDS and serum hepatitis.

Both diseases can be caused by infectious agents in the blood, both
initially were of unknown origin, and both were undetectable, in the

blood by the standard procedures then available for testing.

In view

of the similarities between AIDS and serum hepatitis, the same legal

analysis arguably is applicable to the transfusion contagion of both
diseases.
Strict Liability for Defective Products

Under a products liability theory, liability is imposed upon manufacturers 2 when a defective product causes an injury.30 Manufacturer negligence is irrelevant since the manufacturer's conduct is not
Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 211
So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1968); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967);
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), affd
as modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967); McAllister v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 240
Ga. 246, 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977); Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156
S.E.2d 923 (1967); McMichael v. American Red Cross, 532 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. Ct. App.
1975); Juneau v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 333 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied,
337 So. 2d 220 (La. 1976); Warvel v. Michigan Community Blood Center, 74 Mich.
App. 440, 253 N.W.2d 791 (1977); Jackson v. Muhlenberg, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65
(1969); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792, reh'g denied,
308 N.Y. 812, 123 N.E.2d 869 (1954); Morse v. Riverside Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 422,
339 N.E.2d 846 (1974); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867
(1970); Foster v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 159 W. Va. 147, 219 S.E.2d 916 (1975); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
Cases applying negligence principles include:
Samuels v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 432 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affid in part,
rev'd in part, 591 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1978) (also discussing strict liability); Parr v. Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc., 139 Ga. App. 457, 228 S.E.2d 596 (1976); Tufaro v. Methodist
Hosp., Inc., 368 So. 2d 1219 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Warden v. Southwest La. Hosp.
Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 590 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Hutchins v. Blood Servs., 161 Mont. 359,
506 P.2d 449 (1973); Gilmore v. St. Anthony Hosp., 598 P.2d 1200 (Okla. 1979).
28. Courts denying recovery for transfusion transmitted hepatitis have premised
their decisions upon the fact that in each case at the time of transfusion hepatitis was
undetectable. See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 120-21
(Colo. 1983); Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 750, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 417, 420 (1977); Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130, 1131 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1979). Similarly, many researchers have found AIDS contagion through blood to
be associated with the contagion of various types of hepatitis viruses. See Evatt, supra
note 9, at 501; Jones, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, Hepatitis, and
Haemophilia, 287 BRIT. MED. J. 1737 (1983); Blood Transfusion, Haemophilia, and

AIDS, 8417
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1433, 1434 (Dec. 22/29, 1984).

29. Strict liability has been applied to those in the chain of distribution, including
commercial lessors, Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178 (1970), retailers, Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969), and
even landlords. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213
(1985).
30. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27

at issue. 31 Rather, the court focuses upon the nature of the product
32

and its "defective" condition to determine liability.
Recovery under the theory of products liability generally requires
the sale of a product. 33 Thus, in order to recover under a products
liability theory, the victim of a defective blood transfusion must
prove that a sale occurred in furnishing the blood transfusion.34
Most courts do not recognize a blood transfusion to be a sale of a
product 5 based upon statutory definitions characterizing blood
transfusions as services. 36 These statutes specify that the use or

Cal. Rtpr. 697 (1962); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). See generally W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS. R. KEETON &
D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 692 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER & KEETON].

31. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 454, 266 N.E.2d
897, 903 (1970).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 188 Colo. 353, 534 P.2d 781 (1975).
34. See, e.g., Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (1973).
35. See, e.g., St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 188 Colo. 353, 534 P.2d 781 (1975)
(no sale of a product had occurred because no consensual nor contractual nexus existed
between the hospital and the transfusion recipient); see also Shepard v. Alexian Bros.
Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d at 610, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (stating that "since [Cal.
Health & Safety Code] section 1606 and its underlying rationale compel the conclusion
that a blood transfusion must be regarded as a service, the doctrine of strict liability in
tort is inapplicable as a matter of law").
36. E.g., ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(4) (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.316(e) (1985);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-1151 (1986) (applying to serum hepatitis); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-104 (1974); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19a-280 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-316(5) (1975); FLA.
STAT. ANN. 672.316(5), (6) (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1105 (Harrison
1984); IDAHO CODE § 39-3702 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , 1 5102 (Smith-Hurd
1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-7-2 (Burns 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701 (1980);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.125 (Baldwin 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-108
(Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (West Supp. 1986); MICH.
ComP. LAWS ANN. § 333.9121(2) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5141-1 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.069 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5033-102 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-4001 (1981); NaV. REV. STAT. § 460.010 (1979)
(applying to serum hepatitis); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.11 (Baldwin 1985); OR.
REV. STAT. § 97.300 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-315.1 (1980) (applying to serum hepatitis); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-31-1 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.54.120 (1975 & Supp. 1986) (amended in 1985 to include transfusion of
AIDS as well as hepatitis and malaria); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146-31(2) (West 1974 &
Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-233(c)(iv) (1977).
Strict liability also is precluded by other statutes which state explicitly that the transfusion of blood will not be subject to strict liability. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
32-1481 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1608 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-104
(1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1105 (Harrison 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 327-51
(1976); IDAHO CODE § 39-3702 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. II1 , 1 5102 (Smith-Hurd
1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-7-2 (Burns 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701 (1980);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2797 (West 1965 & Supp. 1985); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
2322.1 (West Supp. 1985); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-402 (1982) (applying to
serum hepatitis); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.9121(3) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986);
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transfusion of blood is not a "sale" for any purpose.37 The effect of
the "any purpose" language is to grant hospitals and blood banks

absolute immunity from sales-based liability including strict liability.
These immunity statutes are intended to promote public health and

welfare:3 8 imposing strict liability adversely would affect the public
health and welfare by inhibiting the development of medical knowl-

edge and by preventing sound medical decisionmaking.3 9 States ef-

fectively proscribe strict liability in order to encourage uninhibited
public access to medical care benefits and scientific advancements.40

Prior to such enactments, however, some courts did find that hospitals and blood banks could be held strictly liable for injuries

caused by blood transfusions.41 These courts had no difficulty char-

MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-33-103 to -104 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 460.010 (1979) (applying to serum hepatitis); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-8-b (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
24-10-5 (1981) (applying to serum hepatitis); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-40 (1978); PA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 42,

§

8333 (Purdon 1982); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§

77.003

(Vernon 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (1975 & Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 146-31(2) (West 1974 & Supp. 1985).
Many of these statutes have been challenged as unconstitutional denials of equal protection. See, e.g., McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App.
3d 866, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1976); see also Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Servs., 506 F.2d 841
(5th Cir. 1975); Bingham v. Lutheran Gen. & Deaconess Hosps., 34 Ill. App. 3d 562,
340 N.E.2d 220 (1975). Such challenges seldom have proved fruitful. Courts recognize

that hospitals and blood banks provide services which are absolutely vital to combatting
illness and disease; they also recognize that the imposition of strict liability seriously
would inhibit medical progress. Therefore, the courts find that because these statutes
serve legitimate purposes, they are not unreasonable, and thus are not unconstitutional
denials of due process or equal protection. McDonald, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 873, 133 Cal.
Rtpr. at 488.
37. For example, California's blood processing statute states:
The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole blood, plasma, blood
products, and blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing the
same, or any of them, into the human body shall be construed to be, and is
declared to be, for all purposes whatsoever, the rendition of a service by each
and every person, firm, or corporation participating therein, and shall not be
construed to be, and is declared not to be a sale of such whole blood, plasma,
blood products, or blood derivatives, for any purpose or purposes whatsoever.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1979).
38. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1607 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22104(1) (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , 115101 (Smith-Hurd 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 43-17-40 (1978); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 77.002 (Vernon 1986).
39.

See, e.g., TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§

77.002 (Vernon 1986).

40. Several of the codes were enacted based upon findings of an existing emergency in the health care field. E.g., 1971 Ark. Acts 462, § 3 (enacting Arkansas' Chapter
16 of Public Health and Safety Title); 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 24, § 3 (enacting
Idaho's Chapter 37 of Health and Safety Title).
41. See, e.g., Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo.
1983) (reversing lower court's denial of liability); Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).

acterizing blood as a product for sale and subject to strict products
liability.42 Nonetheless, for purposes of strict products liability, some
courts have treated blood banks differently from hospitals. These
courts hold only blood banks to be strictly liable because they are
engaged in the business of collecting and distributing blood; whereas
hospitals primarily provide medical services, and blood transfusions
are purely incidental to providing such services. 43 Other courts, however, have found no such distinction because both the hospital and

the blood bank are in the blood distribution chain. 44 In either situation, the courts found the policies underlying strict products liability

applicable to the transfusion of blood in order to enable recovery for
transfusion-related injuries.
The primary goal of strict liability is to compensate innocent victims 45-"to insure that costs of injuries. . . are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the
' Strict
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." 46
liability recognizes that the manufacturer is in the best position both
to insure against the risk of injury and to shift to the public through
higher prices the costs of doing business and securing insurance. 47
42. Cunningham, 47 Ill. 2d at 447, 266 N.E.2d at 899 (finding that blood for
transfusion purposes was "a 'product' in much the same way as other articles wholly
unchanged from their natural state which are distributed for human consumption").
More recently, transfusion-related hepatitis plaintiffs have urged that the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 402A be applied to define blood as an unreasonably dangerous
product to which strict liability would attach. See, e.g., Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood
Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983). These plaintiffs have suggested that blood
be likened to other drugs that are injected into the body to which strict liability does
attach. Nonetheless, in some cases, courts will rely upon the comment k exception to
section 402A in denying strict liability for blood transfusion injuries. In these instances,
blood is designated as unavoidably unsafe because no reliable or medically acceptable
test for hepatitis in the blood existed at the time the transfusion was administered. Belle
Bonfils, 665 P.2d at 122-27; see also Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hosp., 147 N.J.
Super. 252, 371 A.2d 105 (1977).
As an interesting side note, one court has held that because blood transfusions are
unavoidably risky, the contracting of hepatitis through a blood transfusion administered
during surgery for a gunshot wound, which ultimately led to the shooting victim's death,
is not a superseding factor to exculpate a criminal defendant from a manslaughter conviction. People v. Flenon, 42 Mich. App. 457, 202 N.W.2d 471 (1972).
43. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966), afl'd as modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967). Nonetheless, when a hospital undertakes its own collection, processing and distribution of blood, the courts may find no
such distinction. See Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Benitez, 257 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972).
44. Cunningham, 47 I11.2d at 452, 266 N.E.2d at 901.
45. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965)
(stating "the consumer .
is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of
someone ... ).
46. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. at 701; see also Cunningham, 47 III. 2d at 457, 266 N.E.2d at 904. See
generally Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
47. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965)

[VOL. 23: 875. 1986]

Hospital and Blood Bank Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Strict liability also motivates manufacturers to design safer products,
reducing future injuries and liability and, at least in theory, reducing
the net48 cost to society which results from product-related personal
injury.
Arguably, the policy of compensating innocent victims is no less
warranted for blood-related injuries than for other product-related
injuries. Blood transfusion recipients lack the ability to guard against
potential injuries, outside of refusing to receive the blood transfusion
altogether which often is not a viable option. Patients also are not
able to ensure that the transfusion is administered correctly, nor are
they able to inspect the blood for possible infection. On the other
hand, it is hospitals and blood banks which possess the means both
to detect and to eliminate possible impurities in the blood, and to
ensure that blood transfusions are administered properly. It would be
reasonable, therefore, to hold hospitals and blood banks strictly liable for transfusion-contracted diseases; hospitals and blood banks
can spread the risk of such injuries in the form of higher charges for
blood transfusions. However, this argument ignores both the fact
that statutes were enacted specifically to preclude such recovery and
the fact that courts continue to support these statutes in order to
maintain the public health and welfare, to ensure sufficient blood
supplies, 49 and to enable medical treatment and discovery to
advance.

Though most blood immunity statutes were enacted in response to
increasing litigation regarding transfusion-related hepatitis, 50 they

apply equally to all transfusion-related diseases, including AIDS.
Without statutory immunity, hospitals and blood banks would face
enormous expense if held liable for the costs of transfusion-related
AIDS contagion, especially since detection and elimination were not
medically possible when the majority of these transfusions were administered. Imposition of strict liability in cases in which testing was
(stating "public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products
intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a
cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained"); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, at 692.
48. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 30, at 693. It has been suggested that the blood immunity statutes be amended to allow imposition of strict liability
in order to increase product safety and allocate risks. See, e.g., Comment, Strict Liability
for Blood Derivative Manufacturers: Statutory Shield Incompatible with Public Health
Responsibility, 28 SAINT Louis U.L.J. 443 (1984).
49. See, e.g., Cramer v. Queen of Angels Hosp., 62 Cal. App. 3d 812, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 339 (1976).
50. See, e.g., Belle Bonfils, 665 P.2d at 120 n.2.

unavailable would drive up the cost of medical care to prohibitive
levels and also would undermine the availability of blood necessary
for transfusions. Clearly, affordable health care is among the nation's top concerns today. The skyrocketing cost of medical malpractice insurance already has had a significant impact upon health care.
Many states have responded to these increasing costs by enacting
statutes which limit the recovery of medical malpractice victims in
an effort to keep insurance rates at tolerable levels, thereby protecting the future of the health-care professions. 51 The blood transfusion
immunity statutes serve the same protective function-preventing
the imposition of liability without fault for transfusion-related
injuries.52
In Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court,5" the California Sixth
District Court of Appeal held that section 1606 of the California
Health and Safety Code precluded strict liability recovery to a hemophiliac who contracted AIDS. In Hyland Therapeutics, the defendant was neither a hospital nor a blood bank; rather, it manufactured
blood product Factor VIII, a clotting factor developed to correct or
prevent bleeding episodes. The plaintiffs contended that commercial
blood product manufacturers should be treated differently from hospitals and blood banks-that the need for available blood supplies
which mandates immunizing hospitals and blood banks does not apply to commercial manufacturers.5 4 The court rejected the distinction finding that blood product manufacturers should be afforded
protection under section 1606 for the same reasons that support
blood bank and hospital immunity. 55 Relying upon the clear and unambiguous language 58 of section 1606, the court held that Hyland
Therapeutics' manufacturing and distributing of Factor VIII was the
51. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986). For an argument calling for legislative reform of California's statute, see Comment, California's
MICRA: The Need for Legislative Reform, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171 (1986).
52. These statutory immunities only are given to preclude liability without fault;
liability for negligence or wilful misconduct is recognized as the means by which to hold
a blood bank or hospital responsible for the injuries caused by blood transfusions. E.g.,
HAWAIi REV. STAT. § 327-51 (1976).
53. 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 220 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1985).
54. Id. at 515, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
55. Id. at 516, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
56. The Hyland Therapeutics court relied heavily upon the plain meaning rule of
Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ. & Colleges, 33 Cal. 3d 211, 655 P.2d 317, 188
Cal. Rptr. 115 (1982), stating "'if the statutory language is 'clear and unambiguous
there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it.' [Citations]
....'" Hyland Therapeutics, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 514, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 593. Moreover, Hyland Therapeutics considered that "the plain meaning rule [was] fundamental
to the concept of separation of powers. The judiciary has no power to rewrite plain statutory language." Id. Furthermore, Hyland Therapeutics noted that the legislature had
recently addressed the problem of transfusion-associated AIDS, see CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 195 (West Supp. 1986), but did not amend section 1606. Hyland Therapeutics, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 514, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 593.

[VOL. 23: 875, 1986]

Hospital and Blood Bank Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

57
rendition of services not subject to strict liability.
It seems likely that courts will continue to support the statutory

interests which protect the public health and welfare by precluding

strict liability recovery to recipients of blood transfusions who contract AIDS. Hyland Therapeutics supports this position.
Breach of Implied Warranty
Under an implied warranty theory, section 2-314 of the Uniform

Commercial Code imposes liability upon a seller in cases in which
goods not of merchantable quality are sold.5 s Section 2-315 imposes

liability when goods are not fit for the particular purpose for which

they are sold. 59 Because both section 2-314 and section 2-315 apply

only to the sale of goods, 0 it must be determined whether blood
transfusions are goods, the "sale" of which subjects the seller to lia-

bility under the Uniform Commercial Code. 61 Most states have enacted legislation specifying that the use or transfusion of blood is a
"service," not a sale, and therefore does not give rise to an implied
62
warranty.
57. 175 Cal. App. 3d at 514, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 592. The court relied upon a
factually similar hepatitis case in which a hemophiliac contracted serum hepatitis from
clotting factor Konyne. See Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 137
Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977). There, too, the court focused upon the clear intent of section 1606
in defining the distribution of blood products as services even as applied to a commercial
blood product manufacturer. Fogo, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 752, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
58. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1986); see, e.g., Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa.
501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970); Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1979).
59. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1986); see, e.g., Foster v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 159 W. Va.
147, 219 S.E.2d 916 (1975) (discussing West Virginia's implied warranty code section
46-2315).
60. U.C.C. § 2-314 states: "(1) Unless excluded or modified ... a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale .
U.C.C. § 2-315 states:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified ... an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.
Most states have enacted code provisions similar to Uniform Commercial Code section
2-314, see, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE § 2314 (West 1964), and Uniform Commercial Code
section 2-315. See, e.g., N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-315 (McKinney 1964).
61. Some courts have found that strict products liability and implied warranty
actions basically look to the same factors: sale of a product and liability without fault.
See, e.g., McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 352 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Tenn. 1971),
affd, 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972); Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App.
3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973).
62. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.316(e)(1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1481

Again, without sales-based immunity statutes, some courts have
found hospitals and blood banks to be liable under an implied warranty for transfusing defective blood. 63 Courts subjected blood banks
to liability under both implied warranties because the blood banks
were in the business of procuring and selling blood for profit.64
Moreover, these courts also rejected the notion that hospitals were

engaged solely in the business of providing medical services to their

patients,6 5 and concluded that hospitals were engaged in the business

of selling blood to the transfusion recipient,66 especially in cases in
which the hospital charged a fee for the blood.67 Therefore, absent
the statutory immunity, hospitals and blood banks could be found

liable for breaching an implied warranty when furnishing defective
blood.6 8

Nevertheless, when state legislatures have granted hospitals or
blood banks statutory immunity, the courts generally have upheld

(1974); CONN GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-280 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2316(5) (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316(5), (6) (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §
105-1105 (Harrison 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-2-316(5)(Harrison 1979); IDAHO
CODE § 39-3702 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 111 , 5102 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-8-7-2 (Burns 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701 (1980); MD. HEALTHGEN. CODE ANN. § 18-402 (1982) (applying to serum hepatitis); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (West Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.9121(3) (West
1980 & Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.069 (Vernon Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 460.010 (1979) (applying to serum hepatitis); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-8-b (1985);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-5 (1981) (applying to serum hepatitis); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2108.11 (Baldwin 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2151 (West 1984); OR. REV.
STAT. § 97.300 (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8333 (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §
44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-315.1 (1980) (applying to serum hepatitis); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (1979); VA. CODE § 32.1-297
(1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (1975 & Supp. 1986)(amended in 1985 to
include transfusion of AIDS as well as hepatitis and malaria); WYO. STAT. § 34-21233(c)(iv) (1977).
When defects in the blood are detectable by established medical procedures, these
codes may allow recovery under implied warranties. E.g., VA. CODE § 32.1-297 (1985).
Nonetheless, proving an established medical standard for detecting impurities in the
blood is a large obstacle to overcome-an obstacle which depends upon the time of donation and transfusion. Moreover, a focus upon medical standards looks to a negligence
cause of action, rather than one of implied warranty which looks to liability without
fault. See infra text and accompanying notes 72-100.
63. E.g., Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Benitez, 257 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
Reilly v. King County Cent. Blood Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 246 (1971).
64. E.g., Rostocki v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla.
1973); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
65. Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Benitez, 257 So.2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970) (finding that a hospital
providing services still might be liable under implied warranty).
66. Rostocki v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973).
67. Id.
68. E.g., Reilly v. King County Cent. Blood Bank, 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d
246 (1971) (superseded by the enactment of section 70.54.120); Rostocki v. Southwest
Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973) (superseded by the enactment of
section 672.316).
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these immunities, 9 denying recovery under an implied warranty to
recipients of hepatitis-infected blood transfusions.7 0 Following the rationale of Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court,71 transfusion-as-

sociated AIDS victims would be treated no differently. Sales-based
immunity statutes which preclude strict liability -mostlikely will preclude recovery under implied warranty for transfusion-associated
AIDS victims.
Negligence
To recover under negligence, a plaintiff must prove that a standard of care existed, that the defendant's conduct fell below that
standard, and that this conduct was the proximate cause of the

plaintiff 's injury.72 In blood transfusion cases, the standards most
commonly identified concern blood testing and donor screening.

Standards for Blood Testing
The duty owed to a blood transfusion recipient is measured by the

standard of care which exists at the time of the transfusion. 73 This

standard is based upon the ability of medical science to discover the
disease, as well as the ability to develop an accurate, reliable, and

generally accepted method for testing blood for such disease. 74
Most case law concerning blood transfusion liability involves

69. E.g., McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d
866, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1976); Juneau v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 333 So. 2d 354
(La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 337 So. 2d 220 (La. 1976).
In noting that some statutes specifically apply to the transfusion contagion of serum
hepatitis, a question of legislative intent arises-whether the legislature intended the immunities to extend only to hepatitis cases, or whether the legislature intended protection
to extend to all unknown and undetectable diseases that could be transmitted through
blood. In those situations in which the statute applies only to transfusion of hepatitis, the
courts, faced with upholding legislative policies, may be required to interpret the statutes
broadly to include the transfusion of AIDS and other undetectable viruses.
70. See supra note 69.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
72. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Blood Servs., 161 Mont. 359, 506 P.2d 449 (1973); see
also Warden v. Southwest La. Hosp. Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 590 (La. Ct. App. 1974). If the
patient should die, a wrongful death suit may be available. McDonald v. Sacramento
Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 133 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1976).
Actions also have been based upon violations of pure food and drug laws. See Morse v.
Riverside Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 422, 339 N.E.2d 846 (1974). Most courts, however,
have found that whole blood, plasma, and blood products are not "food" or "drugs" for
human consumption, but rather are "human tissue," and thus unnecessary to meet the
standards of the pure food and drug laws. Id. at 424-25, 339 N.E.2d at 849.
73. See Hutchins, 161 Mont. at 362-67, 506 P.2d at 451-53.
74. Id. see also Martin v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 352 So. 2d 351 (La. Ct. App.
1977), writ denied, 354 So. 2d 210 (La. 1978).

plaintiffs who have contracted serum hepatitis. In most of these situations, the virus could not be detected by the state of-the-art blood
testing procedures. Even where detectable, courts would find that the

testing procedures had not developed with sufficient accuracy or reliability to establish a medical standard. 75 Plaintiffs were unable to
prove an existing medical standard for hepatitis testing, and negli-

gence actions in these cases consequently failed.76
Transfusion-associated AIDS victims face obstacles to recovery
identical to those faced by hepatitis victims: an AIDS victim must
establish a standard of accurate and reliable testing available at the
time of the transfusion, despite the long latency period of the disease
during which testing procedures markedly improved. 77 As a result,
recipients of pre-1985 transfusions may have difficulty establishing
any standard of care. Although the cause of AIDS was not discov-

ered until 1984,78 it was not until March 1985 that the Food and

Drug Administration (FDA) licensed the ELISA test for screening

blood for HTLV-III/LAV antibodies.7 9 Because no blood testing

standard had been medically recognized prior to 1985, pre-1985
transfusion-associated AIDS victims will be unable to prove that

AIDS-infected blood transfusions resulted from negligent blood
testing.
75. See Hutchins, 161 Mont. at 362-67, 506 P.2d at 451-53. In fact, Montana,
for example, will not impose liability if blood is tested according to the "latest testing
procedures in accordance with recommendations of the American Association of blood
banks . . . ." MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-33-104 (1985).
76. See generally Hutchins v. Blood Servs., 161 Mont. 359, 506 P.2d 449 (1973).
In Hutchins, four "uncontradicted circumstances" led the court to find that the specific
testing procedure, the SGOT test, had not been implemented nor recognized substantially so as to establish a medical standard:
(a) no blood bank in the United States was using the SGOT test as a routine
screening test;
(b) neither federal regulations nor the accrediting standards of the American
Association of Blood Banks required or had ever required the use of the SGOT
test on prospective donors;
(c) neither the Public Health Service, the American Association of Blood
Banks of the American Medical Association Committee on Transplantation
and Transfusion had ever recommended the use of SGOT testing; and
(d) although some writers had suggested investigating the usefulness of SGOT
for blood donors, those who were recognized as authorities in blood banking
had concluded it was not a useful or meaningful test for purposes of screening
blood donors.
Hutchins, 161 Mont. at 365, 506 P.2d at 452.
77. For statute of limitations purposes, however, the latency period may serve to
postpone the tolling of the statute until the AIDS victim discovers, or reasonably could
have discovered, the disease. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982) (in
action against health care provider, the time for commencing the action shall be one year
after the plaintiff discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the
injury).
78. Not until June 1984 was the medical community fairly certain that the cause
of AIDS was HTLV-III/LAV, a retrovirus. See Fischinger, supra note 3.
79. See supra note 23.
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Nonetheless, in 1985 when detection of the AIDS virus in blood
became medically possible, 0 most donor centers began using the
ELISA test.81 Furthermore, the Public Health Service recommended
that all blood or plasma should be tested for HTLV-III/LAV antibodies,8 2 and if found, the blood or plasma should be discarded.y3

The availability and rapid implementation of the ELISA test arguably established a medical standard upon which to base a negligence
action. If a transfusion recipient contracts AIDS from blood or
plasma which could have been tested, the blood bank could be liable

in negligence for the resulting injuries, either for failing to test the
blood, for failing to test according to the proper procedures, or for

failing to discard blood known to be infected.
The test is not completely accurate-this may provide a barrier to

recovery. Blood showing no sign of HTLV-III/LAV antibodies still
may slip through with the virus undetected.8 4 To reduce the possibil-

ity that infected blood may pass undetected, blood donor centers now
are using the ELISA test together with existing screening procedures

for eliminating high risk donors.88

Standards for Donor Screening
Liability for transfusion-associated injuries also may be established by proving that an existing procedure for screening potential

donors was not followed by the collecting agency. Victims of transfu80. For example, California has enacted legislation requiring blood banks and
plasma centers to test blood and plasma for the causative agent of AIDS. 1985 Cal.
Legis. Serv. ch. 23 (West). Section 4, article 8 of Assembly Bill No. 488, mandating
testing for AIDS, is designated to supplement already implemented programs for testing
blood for serum hepatitis and other blood-transmitted diseases.
81. See supra note 25.
82. See generally Review, supra note 1.
83. Review, supra note 1.
84. Id. at 17. For example, a recent journal notes a case of a high risk person who
was allowed to donate blood. The donor was a man who admittedly had only one homosexual encounter in the past year. The sexual partner, however, actively had been engaged in homosexual encounters for the past four years. Clearly these facts indicate that
both men were of potentially high risk for carrying the AIDS virus. The difficult factor
was that the donor tested negative for the HTLV-III/LAV virus. This case indicates the
problems inherent in merely using the ELISA test as the only means of preventing transfusion-associated AIDS. It also indicates the necessity of supplementing the ELISA test
with other tests, for example the Western Bloc test, as well as the donor screening questioning procedures, which in theory will eliminate anyone with a high risk of carrying
AIDS. See CDC Transfusion-Associated Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type 111/
Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus Infection From a Seronegative Donor-Colorado,
35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 389 (1986).
85. Review, supra note I, at 17.

sion-associated hepatitis have suggested that a blood bank's failure
to effectively screen potential donors is negligent conduct. 86 In Hoder
v. Sayet,87 the Florida District Court of Appeal noted that the blood
bank had the duty to correctly ascertain a donor's health and health
history as part of the donor screening procedure, since the donor's
health, well-being, and prior disease history would have established
the probability that a donor had hepatitis. 88
Similarly, in Tufaro v. Methodist Hospital, Inc.,89 the Louisiana
Court of Appeal also recognized that failure to detect a strain of
malaria in blood to be used for transfusion purposes might be negligent conduct. The Tufaro court, however, noted that liability would
turn on whether the blood bank was capable of detecting the malaria
strain using the available procedures for testingY0 Because no test
for malaria in the blood existed at the time, donor screening was the
only available means to exclude malaria-infected blood. 91 Whether a
donor had a high risk of malaria could be determined by asking
standardized questions regarding illnesses and relevant medical history. The Tufaro court held that for the plaintiffs to prevail, they
would have had to establish that the donated blood was collected
using methods unacceptable to the medical community at the time
the blood was donated. In effect, the plaintiffs would have had to
prove that the blood bank did not comply with the medical community's standards because it did not adopt or ask the specific screening
questions. Alternatively, plaintiffs would have had to establish that
the donor center, having implemented the guidelines and procedures,
negligently failed to conduct the screening as specifically directed,
and, in effect, allowed a known high risk donation. 2
In 1983 the medical community discovered the potential for AIDS
86. E.g., Klaus v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n Blood Bank, 62 Cal.
App. 3d 417, 420, 133 Cal. Rptr. 92, 93 (1976) ("[A] failure to use reasonable means of
[choosing donors to mitigate the possibility of infection] could furnish the basis for a
cause of action in negligence.").
87. 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
88. Id. at 209.
89. 368 So. 2d 1219 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
90. Id. at 1221.
91. The following groups were precluded from donating because of the high risk
for transmitting malaria:
a) anyone with a history of malaria;
b) a United States citizen who had, six-months prior, visited an endemic country (where malaria was prevalent);
c) anyone who had taken anti-malarial drugs within the last three years; and
d) military personnel stationed in an endemic country within the last three
years.
Id. at 1220.
92. Id. at 1221. The court held that plaintiffs had not proven effectively that donor screening procedures were not followed adequately, based primarily upon the donor's
unreliable testimony. Id.
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to be transmitted through blood" and blood products,94 and began
eliminating members of known high risk groups from the donor
pool, 95 using procedures similar to those which had proved effective
in reducing the risk of transfusion-associated hepatitis and malaria. 96

The FDA Office of Biologics recommended eliminating from the donor pool homosexual and bisexual males with multiple sexual partners, intraveneous drug abusers, Haitian immigrants, and sexual
partners of any high risk group member,97 as these classes repre-

sented the known high risk groups. Furthermore, programs were initiated to educate high risk group members of the potential danger

for AIDS transmission if they were to donate blood. These programs
urged high risk group members to refrain completely from donating
blood. 98
The medical community maintained that these procedures, though
not perfect, significantly would reduce the risk of contracting AIDS

through blood transfusions.99 Arguably, the potential for AIDS-in-

fected blood diminished as early as 1983 when these steps were un-

dertaken to combat the contamination of blood with the AIDS virus.
Infected blood might have been transfused as the result of a blood

bank's failure to comply with standard screening procedures which
would have precluded a high risk person from donating blood. It

seems likely, therefore, that a plaintiff could maintain a viable cause
of action in negligence against a blood bank if he could prove he

93.

Curran, supra note 5.

94. Perkins, Transfusion-AssociatedAIDS, 19

FRONT. RADIAT. THER. ONc. 23,
24 (1985).
95. See, e.g., Pindyck, Waldman, Zang, Oleszko, Lowy & Bianco, Measures to
Decrease the Risk of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Transmission by Blood
Transfusion, 25 TRANSFUSION 3 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Pindyck].
96. Id. at 9. Suggested subjects about which to question potential donors include
a "history of intraveneous drug abuse, hepatitis, unexplained weight loss of greater than
10 pounds, unexplained persistent fever, symptoms of acute respiratory infection, including cough . . . recurrent night sweats, persistent diarrhea, persistent cough, [or] the
presence of skin nodules suggestive of Kaposi's sarcoma." Id. at 4; see also Safe Blood
for Transfusion, 25 THE MED. LETTER 93 (1983).
97. See Pindyck, supra note 95.
98. Id. at 9; see also Sandier & Katz, Impact of AIDS on Blood Services in the
United States, 46 Vox SANGUINIS 1, 3 (1984). With the increased number of nonhigh
risk group members carrying the disease, additional recommendations for prevention
have been established for the purposes of increasing knowledge of AIDS, facilitating
behavorial change to reduce risks of HTLV-II/LAV infection, and encouraging industry
research. See CDC Additional Recommendations to Reduce Sexual and Drug-AbuseRelated Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/LymphadenopathyAssociated Virus, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 152, 153-54 (1986).
99. See generally Pindyck, supra note 95; Review, supra note 1, at 16-21.

contracted AIDS through blood transfused as early as 1983.1"'

Causation
To recover in negligence, blood transfusion injury victims must
prove that the disease actually was contracted through the blood
transfusion. Although courts often have approached the burden of
proving causation differently, all have agreed that causation must be
established for recovery under a negligence theory. 10 1 Meeting the

burden of proving causation might be accomplished by eliminating
the possibility of other causes of AIDS; for example, a plaintiff

might submit evidence that he is neither a homosexual, an intravaneous drug user, nor a sexual partner of any high risk group member.
The nature of the disease also may assist in rebutting nontransfusion causes. In DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Company,10 2 the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that two factors were
significant in rebutting other possible causes of hepatitis. First, the

court recognized that the delay in the manifestation of the plaintiff's
hepatitis was consistent with contracting hepatitis through a blood
transfusion. Second, the court noted that the plaintiff contracted se-

rum hepatitis, which most commonly is transmitted through blood,
100. Several other negligence-based causes of action have been suggested in the
past by transfusion-associated hepatitis victims. Plaintiffs have suggested that it is negligence per se for a hospital to obtain blood from a commercial blood bank, because commercial procurement from paying donors increases the likelihood of infected blood since
most paid blood donors usually are not of the best health. See Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d
205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Although the Hoder court determined that such conduct
was not negligence per se, the court found that if the hospital had reason to know that a
blood bank's testing or screening procedures in selecting donors were inadequate, then
such a negligence action may be available. Id.
Similarly, it has been found that obtaining blood from a paid donor is not negligence
per se simply because paid donors pose a higher risk of hepatitis transmission. Instead,
whether such action is negligence will be a question of fact. Gilmore v. St. Anthony
Hosp., 598 P.2d 1200 (Okla. 1979); see also Hutchins v. Blood Servs., 161 Mont. 359,
506 P.2d 449 (1973); Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hosp., 147 N.J. Super. 252, 371
A.2d 105 (1977).
Furthermore, a doctor or surgeon may be liable for negligently failing to warn of the
high risk in contracting hepatitis from blood transfusions. See Heirs of Fruge v. Blood
Servs., 506 F.2d 841, 848 (5th Cir. 1975). Likewise, such a cause of action may be
available to an AIDS victim. Once it was discovered that AIDS could be transmitted
through blood transfusions, a doctor may have had the duty to caution patients from
undergoing purely elective surgery. See Perkins, supra note 94, at 24. A failure by the
doctor to give such a warning may be a breach of this duty owed to the patient.
For a general discussion of many of the implications of AIDS on blood services, see
Lipton, Blood Donor Services and Liability Issues Relating to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 131 (1986).
101. E.g., Warden v. Southwest La. Hosp. Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 590 (La. Ct. App.
1974) (causation is a material fact at issue, thus summary judgment was improper);
Huffman v. SS. Mary & Elizabeth Hosp., 475 S.W.2d 631 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972) (requiring causation to be established, but finding that the blood transfusion caused the plaintiff
to contract the hepatitis virus).
102. 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836 (1982).
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rather than infectious hepatitis, which is transmitted orally.103 Once
this evidence was introduced, the court shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that the transfusion was not the cause of the plaintiff 's contracting hepatitis. 0 4
This two-prong method also may prove workable for transfusionassociated AIDS victims to rule out other causes of AIDS. First, the
latency period in developing AIDS symptoms after contracting the
virus-approximately twenty-seven months "05-- may indicate when
the virus was contracted. An AIDS victim might prove causation by
submitting evidence that he received a blood transfusion more than
two years before developing the symptoms. Second, the type of underlying infection the patient suffers also may be significant. An
AIDS victim can offer evidence that he suffers from an opportunistic
infection such as pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, rather than from
Kaposi's sarcoma which predominantly afflicts homosexual AIDS
victims.106 When an AIDS victim can present such evidence, the
DeBattista rationale suggests shifting the burden of proving another
cause to the hospital or blood bank.
When causation is unknown or cannot be proved, plaintiffs have
urged that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows an inference
of
107
negligence both against a hospital and against a blood bank. Most
courts, however, have not allowed such an application. Res ipsa loquitur requires that the defendant have exclusive control over the
thing or instrumentality causing the injury, 10 8 which in this situation
would be the infected blood. But if a blood bank collects the blood
and a hospital transfuses the blood, it is not conclusive that either
had exclusive control of the infected blood.109 Consequently, res ipsa
loquitur would not be a viable basis upon which transfusion-associated AIDS victims would be able to avoid proving causation through
an inference of negligence.11 Rather, AIDS victims will have to rely
103. DeBattista, 403 So. 2d at 29.
104. Id.
105. See Fischinger, supra note 3, at 19.
106. Older transfusion recipients face a further obstacle in proving causation by
proving the type of underlying symptoms, because older recipients may be more likely to
develop Kaposi's sarcoma. Id. at 11.
107. E.g., McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 352 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Tenn.
1971), aff d, 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972); St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 534 P.2d 781
(Colo. 1975); Morse v. Riverside Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 422, 339 N.E.2d 846 (1974).
108. McDaniel, 352 F. Supp. at 692; Morse, 44 Ohio App. 2d at 424, 339 N.E.2d
at 849.
109. See Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50
(1964).
110. California courts may approach differently the burden of proving causation

on traditional methods for proving causation.
CONCLUSION

Three possible modes of recovery exist for a victim of an AIDSinfected blood transfusion-negligence, strict products liability, and
breach of implied warranty. This Comment has set forth that the
law generally precludes hospital or blood bank liability in every form
but negligence. Absent any legislative change in characterizing blood
transfusions as sales rather than services, strict liability and implied
warranty actions will not provide recovery. If, however, an AIDS
victim can prove the elements of a negligence cause of action-that
standards for blood testing or donor screening existed but were not
followed, causing AIDS to be contracted through the blood transfusion-then an AIDS plaintiff may be able to maintain a viable cause
of action.
ROBERT

C.

GREIF

by res ipsa loquitur after Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). In
Ybarra, the plaintiff argued that "exclusive control" meant any person that could have
had some control over the instrumentality causing the injury. Nonetheless, Ybarra enabled this loosening of the "exclusive control" requirement only in cases in which the
plaintiff would be unconscious while undergoing surgery. In cases of blood transfusion
injuries, the two potential defendants are not engaged in one course of action, as in one
surgical procedure; rather, the potential defendants actually perform two separate functions. Therefore, it does not seem likely that this factor independently will make a plaintiff's proof of causation easier in California.

